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Abstract 
Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) developed the notion of “strategy as guided 
evolution,” using the case of Oticon A/S.  This note points out that the 
radical “spaghetti” organization described by Lovas and Ghoshal has been 
partially abandoned in Oticon.  Developing an organizational economics 
interpretation of this episode, the present note argues that there are 
important implications for the understanding of the conditions under which 
internal hybrids may be viable and contribute to competitive advantage.  The 
main focus in on the managerial commitment problem. Testable propositions 
are derived. 
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Introduction 
Increasingly, organizational structure is seen as an important source of sustained 
competitive advantage.  In particular, much attention has been devoted lately to how 
firms by combining coordination mechanisms (Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000) in 
novel ways can design organizational structures that foster entreprenerial initiative 
and helps to integrate and build knowledge, while keeping agency costs at bay 
(Miles and Snow 1992; Zenger and Hesterly 1997; Day and Wendler 1998; 
Mosakowski 1998).  In overall terms, these unconventional ways of combining 
coordination mechanisms amount to infusing hierarchies with coordination 
mechanisms characteristic of the market (i.e., internal hybrids) or of infusing market 
relations with coordination mechanisms characteristic of the hierarchy (i.e., external 
hybrids) (Zenger and Hesterly 1997).  For example, Helper et al. (2000: 443) describe 
how firms in the US auto industry are capable of building “pragmatic relationships” 
which allow them to “… continuously improve their joint products and processess 
without the need for a clear division of property rights,” and which “… both advance 
knowledge and control opportunism.”  These relationships are clearly examples of 
external hybrids. However, firms may also use internal hybrids to reach the goals of 
advancing knowledge while controlling opportunism.   
 An example of this has recently been described by Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) for 
the purpose of developing a notion of “strategy as guided evolution.”   They use the 
case of the decision-making processes and administrative systems (i.e., the 
organization of task division) in the Danish hearing aids producer, Oticon A/S.  
Oticon became world-famous for its radical delegation and empowerment 
experiment ⎯ implemented in 1991 and aptly marketed as the ”spaghetti 
organization” ⎯, which introduced “… revolutionary new assumptions of what it 
meant to work and how one worked” (Gould 1994: 456).  To many observers, Oticon 
seemed to be an outstanding example of achieving integration and recombination of 
knowledge by means of loosely coupled administrative systems that were explicit 
seen as hard-to-replicate sources of competitive advantage (Gould 1994). In fact, a 
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small cottage industry has recently emerged on the Oticon spaghetti experiment as 
an example of how dynamic capabilities may be grown on the basis an almost pure 
project-based organization, and how strategy may emerge from (partly steered) 
evolutionary processes in such an organization (particularly Lovas and Ghoshal 
2000; Ravasi and Verona 2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999).  
 However, recent accounts of the Oticon spaghetti organization fail to note that 
the spaghetti organization in its initial radical form (as described, e.g., in Lovas and 
Ghoshal 2000) does not exist anymore in Oticon ⎯ it has been superceded by more 
structured administrative systems (“Oticon ⎯ Spaghetti and Beyond”). In the 
organizational economics interpretation briefly developed in the following, the 
Oticon spaghetti experiment foundered on a number of design mistakes that relate to 
the problem of introducing market mechanisms in hierarchies (Williamson 1985; 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999, 2000) and which necessitated a move to more 
structured administrative system.  In particular, the “steering” by management 
discussed by Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) in actuality turns out to have created deep-
seated incentive problems (“Why Was the Spaghetti Organization Changed?”).  This 
suggests that some care should be exercised when using the case of Oticon to 
develop managerial prescriptions relating to the adoption of internal hybrids with 
the aim of fostering dynamic capabilities (Ravasi and Verona 2000; Verona and 
Ravasi 1999) or conceptualizing strategy as guided evolution.  More positively, it 
suggests that managerial commitment problems (Miller 1992; Williamson 1996; 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999, 2000) may be crucial to the understanding of the 
contribution of organizational structure to competitive advantage (“Implications for 
Internal Hybrids and Competitive Advantage”).  
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Oticon – Spaghetti and Beyond1
Oticon: The Spaghetti Organization 
 Founded in 1904 and based mainly in Denmark, Oticon (now William Demant 
Holding A/S) is a world leader in the hearing aids industry.2  For a number of years 
in the beginning to the mid-1990s, Oticon became one of the best-known and 
admired examples of radical organizational turnaround. The turnaround aimed 
increasing employee empowerment and responsibility, reducing product 
development cycles, increasing contact to customers, mobilizing dispersed and 
“hidden” existing knowledge, and building new knowledge.  These goals would be 
reached by means of a radical project-based organizational structure that should be 
explicitly “knowledge-based” (Kolind 1990) and “anthropocentric,” yet based on 
“free market forces” (Lyregaard 1993).  It should be capable of combining and re-
combining skills in a flexible manner, where skills and other resources would move 
to those (new) uses where they were most highly valued. 
The new organization amounted to breaking down the earlier functional 
department-based organization into an almost completely flat, almost 100 percent 
project-based organization.  Departments gave way to “competence centers” (e.g., in 
mechanical engineering, audiology, etc.) that broke with the boundaries imposed by 
the old departments. Rather than being assigned tasks from the above, employees 
now had a choice to decide which projects they would join.  All projects were to be 
announced on an electronic bulletin board, where employees who would like to join 
them could sign in. The much noted “multi-job” principle meant, first, that 
employees were not restricted in the number of projects they could, and, second, that 
                                                 
1 The following is based on archival sources, newspaper and magazine articles, an interview with 
Oticon HRM manager, Henrik Holck and correspondence with former CEO, Lars Kolind (both in June 
2000), as well as the large number of very rich and thick descriptions of Oticon that have been 
produced by a number of mainly Danish academics, journalists and Oticon insiders throughout the 
1990s (in particular, Lyregaard 1993; Poulsen 1993; Morsing 1995; Morsing and Eiberg 1998; Eskerod 
1997, 1998; Jensen 1998; Foss and Hertz 2000). 
2 The history of Oticon prior to the introduction of the spaghetti organization is extensively covered in 
Poulsen (1993) and Morsing (1995), and, briefer, in Gould (1994) and Lomas and Ghoshal (2000: 877-
878). 
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employees were actively encouraged (and in the beginning actually required) to 
develop and include skills outside their skill portfolio.  Project managers were free to 
manage the project as they preferred, and accordingly received a considerable 
amount of decision making power. For example, they received the right to negotiate 
salaries.3  The project team was required to undertake all the tasks connected with 
product development until the product was successfully introduced in all markets.. 
Finally, although project teams were self-organizing and basically left to mind their 
own business once their projects were ratified, they were still to meet with a ”Project 
and Product Committee” once every three months for ongoing project evaluation.4  
Interpreting Spaghetti 
From an organizational economics point of view, the immediately noticeable 
aspect of the spaghetti organization is the importance of the market metaphor in the 
design of the new administrative structure (Lyregaard 1993). In the Oticon 
simulation of the market, employees were given many and far-reaching decision 
rights. Development projects could be initiated by, in principle, any employee, just 
like entrepreneurs in a market setting. Project groups were self-organizing in much 
the same way that, for example, partnerships are self-organizing.  The setting of 
salaries was decentralized to project leaders. Most hierarchical levels were eliminated 
and formal titles done away with, etc.  Thus, the intention was that the organization 
should mimic the market in such dimensions as flexibility, autonomy, flatness, etc.   
A major problem that besets centralized decision-making systems ⎯ in large 
firms as well as in centralized economies ⎯ is that they have difficulties efficiently 
mobilizing and utilizing important local knowledge, such as the precise 
characteristics of specific processes, employees, machines, or customer preferences.  
As Hayek (1945) explained, the main problem is that much of this knowledge is 
                                                 
3 Although the variance on the distribution of salaries was increased as a result of the new reward 
schemes that characterized the spaghetti organization, average salaries do not appear to have 
changed.  
4 Complementary measures were taken to back up these initiatives. For example, Kolind introduced 
an employee stock program, which was motivated by the need to raise needed additional money for 
the transformation, and he invested 26 millions DKK of his own funds in Oticon. 
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transitory, fleeting and/or tacit, and therefore costly to articulate and transfer to a 
(corporate) center.  Markets are not plagued by these type problems to the same 
extent.  Rather than involving the transfer of costly-to-transfer knowledge to those 
with decision rights (as in a command economy or a centralized firm), markets tend 
to economize on the costs of transferring knowledge by instead allocating decision 
rights to those who possess the relevant knowledge (Hayek 1945; Jensen and 
Meckling 1992).  
The Oticon spaghetti organization was very much an attempt to mimic the 
market in these dimensions.  Thus, a basic problem in the old organization had been 
that commercially important knowledge simply didn’t reach the relevant decision-
makers. By giving project teams extensive decision rights, making ideas for projects 
public and requiring that teams/project groups possessed the necessary 
complementary skills for a particular marketing, research or development task, the 
spaghetti organization stimulated a co-location of decision rights with local 
knowledge.  Those who held the relevant knowledge were also to have the authority 
to decide over the use of company resources, at least within limits.   
Decision Rights 
It is the same co-location that takes place in a well-functioning market.  
However, Oticon remained a firm; its use of “free market forces” (Lyregaard 1993) 
was fundamentally a simulation, for the full decentralization of decision rights that 
characterizes market organization never took place in Oticon (and neither could it).  
In lieu of a distinct price mechanism that could coordinate actions, the market-like 
spaghetti organization was to be kept together by a shared set of values (Kolind 
1994), advanced information technology, the charismatic leadership of CEO Lars 
Kolind himself, and, last but certainly not least, by a committee, staffed by Kolind 
and three other managers, the primary purpose of which was to approve of or reject 
proposed projects (the Projects and Products Committee).  This committee, as well as 
the strongly overlapping top management committee, were the real holders of power 
⎯ they possessed ultimate decision rights.  
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In general, firms confront a problem that markets confront to a smaller degree, 
namely that of making sure that decision rights are utilized efficiently, in other 
words, the problem of moral hazard.  There was no apriori guarantee that project 
leaders and other employees would act in the interest of the firm. Several of the 
components of the spaghetti organization may be seen as responses to this 
fundamental agency problem.  The rights to allocate resources to a particular project 
may be broken down into the rights to 1) initiate a project, 2) ratify projects, 3) 
implement projects, and 4) monitor and evaluate projects (cf. Fama and Jensen 1983).  
For reasons of efficiency, firms usually don’t concentrate these rights in the same 
hands; rather initiation and implementation rights may be controlled by one person 
(or team) while ratification and monitoring rights are controlled by other persons, 
usually hierarchical superiors.5   
This allocation of control rights corresponds to that of the Oticon spaghetti 
organization.  Thus, anybody could make initiate a project, in the sense of sketching, 
making preliminary plans, doing the required calculations, making contacts, etc.  
However, projects had to be evaluated by the Products and Projects Committee 
(“PPC”) that was staffed by Kolind, the development manager, the marketing 
manager and the support manager- The Project and Products Committee was the real 
holder of power in Oticon.  Frequent intervention on the part of the Committee ex 
post made that clear to everybody.  Project teams were required to report to the 
Committee on a three months basis, and the Committee could at any time halt or 
close down projects, something which happened quite frequently.  Thus, decision 
management (i.e., initiation and daily project management) was separated from 
decision control (i.e., project evaluation and monitoring).  The internal market was, in 
actuality, very much a managed one.  Although a considerable amount of variety 
was indeed allowed to evolve, the selection over this variety was very much guided 
by the visible hand of the PPC (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000).   
                                                 
5  Exceptions may occur when giving subordinates more extensive rights (e.g., a package of initiation, 
ratification and implementation rights) strengthens employee incentives (see Aghion and Tirole 1997;  
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999 for analyses of this).  
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Retreating From Spaghetti  
A retreat from the radical spaghetti organization that Kolind had implemented 
in 1991 began long before he resigned as CEO in 1998.  In 1996, Oticon headquarters 
was divided into three “business teams” (“Team Advanced,” “Team Technology,” 
and “Team High Volume”) which function as overall administrative units around 
projects.  Each business team is managed by two team leaders, namely a technician 
and a person with marketing or human resource skills.  These teams refer directly to 
Niels Jakobsen, the new CEO.  In addition to the business teams, a “Competence 
Center” is in charge of all projects and their financing and of an operational group 
controlling administration, IT, logistics, sales and exports. It is one of the successors 
to the abandoned Project and Products Committee; however, its style of managing 
the projects is very different. In particular, care is taken to avoid the erratic behavior 
with respect to intervening in already approved of projects that characterized the 
PPC. The team leaders and the head of the Competence Center comprise, together 
with the CEO, the “Development Group,” which essentially is the senior executive 
group and is in charge of overall strategy making.  Much of the initiative with respect 
to starting new projects is taken by the Development Group. Many of the decision-
making rights held earlier by project leaders have now been concentrated in the 
hands of the Competence Center, or the managers of the business teams. Project 
leaders are appointed by the Competence Center; the right to be a project leader is 
not something that one grabs, as under the spaghetti organization.  Although multi-
jobs/multi-tasking are still allowed, this practice is no longer directly encouraged, 
and its prevalence has been much reduced.  Although Oticon is still characterized by 
considerable decentralization and delegation of rights, many of the crucial elements 
of the spaghetti organization have been left.   What happened?  
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Why Was the Spaghetti Organization Changed? 
Some Basic Design Problems 
 An organizational economics perspective suggests that although the spaghetti 
organization was characterized by substantial coherence obtaining between its 
complementary elements, it was still beset by a number of problems that may 
arguably have been among the causes of its partial abandonment about five years 
later.  
 First, the spaghetti organization eliminated most hierarchical levels, leading to a 
problem of the allocation of managerial competence. Hierarchy couldn’t be used 
anymore as a sorting mechanism for allocating skills so that those with more decisive 
knowledge would obtain authority over those with less decisive knowledge (Casson 
1994). Second, from an incentive perspective, the extremely flat spaghetti organization 
sacrificed an incentive instrument, since it abolished tournaments between 
managers.  Third, the multi-job led to severe coordination problems, because project 
leaders had very little guarantee that they could actually carry a project to its end, 
given that anybody at the project could leave at will, if noticing a superior 
opportunity in the internal job market. Apparently, reputation mechanisms were not 
sufficient to cope with this problem.  Fourth, contrary to aim of making Oticon a 
knowledge-sharing environment, knowledge tended to be held back within projects, 
because of the widespread, and correct, perception that projects were essentially in 
competition over resources. Monitoring systems apparently couldn’t cope 
satisfactorily with these problems.6 Fifth, influence activities (Milgrom 1988) were 
important under the spaghetti organization. Personal relations to those who staffed 
the Committee became paramount for having a project ratified by the Committee 
                                                 
6  Possibly as a reflection of these problems, the most crucial variable with respect to determining 
salary changes in the present organization is the degree to which an employee contributes to 
knowledge-sharing. 
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(Eskerod 1998: 80).7  However, the perhaps most important incentive problem related 
to the behavior of the PPC. 
Selective Intervention in Oticon 
 Few writers on internal hybrids ⎯ such as the Oticon spaghetti organization ⎯ 
recognize the incentive problem that in the literature goes under the name of the 
”impossibility of (efficient) selective intervention.”8 Oliver Williamson (1996:150) 
describes this as 
… a variant on the theme, “Why aren’t more degrees of freedom always 
better than less?.” In the context of firm and market organization, the 
puzzle is, “Why can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of small 
firms can and more.” By merely replicating the market the firm can do no 
worse than the market.  And if the firm can intervene selectively (namely, 
intervene always but only when expected net gains can be projected), then 
the firm will sometimes do better.  Taken together, the firm will do at least 
as well as, and will sometimes do better than, the market. 
Williamson flatly argues that selection intervention is ”impossible.” Incentives are 
diluted, because the option to intervene ”… can be exercised both for good cause (to 
support expected net gains) and for bad (to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” 
(Williamson 1996: 150-151).  Promises to only intervene for good cause can never be 
credible, because they are unenforcable. However, the conclusion that ”selective 
intervention” is strictly impossible may not be correct.  It is in fact conceivable that 
the intervenor may credibly commit to not intervene in such a way that the ”subgoals 
of the intervenor” are promoted.  
 The logic may be exemplified as follows (cf. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999).  
Assume that a subordinate initiates a project, and that the manager has information 
that is necessary to perform an assessment of the project, but that he decides upfront 
                                                 
7  Foss (2000) discusses whether these design mistakes were remediable, concluding that they were 
not. 
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to ratify any project that the subordinate proposes.  Effectively, this amounts to full 
informal delegation of the rights to initiate and ratify projects.9 Because the 
subordinate values being given freedom, this will induce more effort in searching for 
new projects (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  The expected benefits of these increased 
efforts may overwhelm the expected costs from bad projects that the manager has to 
ratify.  However, the problem is that because the manager has information about the 
state of a project (”bad” or ”good”), he may be tempted to renege on a promise to 
delegate decision authority, that is, intervene in a “selective” manner.  But if he 
overrules the subordinate, the latter will lose trust in him, holding back on effort.  In 
this game a number of equilibria are feasible, as determined by te discount rate of the 
manager, the specific trigger strategy followed by the sub-ordinate (e.g., will he lose 
trust in the manager for all future periods if he is overruled?), and how much the 
manager values his reputation for not reneging relative to the benefits of reneging on 
a bad project. 
It is arguable that one of the reasons why the spaghetti organization was 
changed into a more hierarchical organization has to do with the sort of problems 
described by notions of selective intervention.  Thus, the official rhetoric of a flexible 
market-based structure, with substantial autonomy and the management team (i.e., 
the PPC) acting as little more than facilitator and coordinator (Kolind 1990; 
Lyregaard 1993), was increasingly at odds with the frequent selective intervention on 
the part of the PPC.   Selective intervention was partly motivated by the fact that the 
“…PPC does not make general written plans, which are accessible to the rest of the 
organization … if this were done, plans would have to be adjusted or remade in an 
ever-continuing process, because the old plans had become outdated”  (Eskerod 
1998: 80).  Thus, instead of drafting and continuously revise plans under the impact 
of changing contingencies, the PPC preferred to intervene directly in projects.  In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 Day and Wendler (1998) is an exception.  The impossibility of selective intervention problem is just 
one of a broader class of managerial commitment problems; see Miller (1992).   
9 “Informal,” because the formal right to ratify is still in the hands of the manager and because that 
right cannot be allocated to the subordinate through a court-enforceable contract (cf. Williamson 
1996). 
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this was taken by the PPC to be a quite natural feature of a flexible, project-oriented 
organization   (Eskerod 1998: 89).  However, it also led to diluted incentives and 
strongly harmed intrinsic motivation (as documented at length by Eskerod 1997, 
1998).  
  The present Oticon organization is characterized by a much more consistent 
approach towards projects on the part of the Competence Center (one of the 
descendants of the PPC).  Projects are rarely stopped or abandoned, and there is a 
stated policy of sticking to ratified projects.  First, projects now rest on generally 
more secure ground, having been more carefully researched beforehand.  Second, the 
wish to avoid harming motivation (i.e., diluting incentives) by overruling going 
projects is strongly stressed.  Apparently, present Oticon management has realized 
the need to credibly commit to a policy of non-interference with going projects.   In 
contrast, one of the main problems of the old spaghetti organization was that Kolind 
and the PPC never committed in this way; neither, apparently, did they intend to do 
so.  Kolind’s view appears to have been that in important respects and in many 
situations, they were likely to possess the decisive overall knowledge, and that 
efficient utilization of resources dictated intervening in, and sometimes closing 
down, projects.  However, that view clashed on a basic level with the rhetoric of 
widespread delegation of decision rights. 
Implications for Internal Hybrids and Competitive Advantage 
There is empirical evidence of an increasing adoption of internal hybrids 
(Mendelsson and Pillai 1999; Zenger and Hesterly 1997). Proponents of internal 
hybrids argue that these forms are particularly likely sources of competive adantages 
under knowledge-intensive conditions.  As Miles et al. (1997: 7) argue:  
A number of leading companies today are experimenting with a new way 
of organizing – the cellular form.  Cellular organizations are built on the 
principles of entrepreneurship, self-organization, and member ownership.  
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In the future, cellular organizations will be used in situations requiring 
continuous learning and innovation. 
Similar arguments were invoked by the proponents of the Oticon spaghetti 
organization (Kolind 1990, 1994; Lyregaard 1993).  In turn, this suggests that we may 
learn something from the Oticon experience about the limits to internal hybrids.  
 Zenger (1997: 4) argues that attempts to infuse hierarchies with coordination 
mechanisms characteristic of market organization often  ”… violate patterns of 
complementarity that support traditional hierarchy as an organizational form.”  For 
example, managers implement new structures without new performance measures 
and new pay systems, or they implement new pay systems without developing new 
performance measures. The present note has illustrated the importance as well as the 
difficulty of “getting (all) the complementarities right.”  Thus, although the spaghetti 
organization consisted of highly complementary organizational elements (Foss 2000), 
this was not sufficient to secure its viability.  The fundamental problem was that the 
importance of the managerial commitment problem was not recognized, or at least 
not recognized as a part of the problem of achieving complementarity between 
organizational elements.   
 It has been suggested that designing a radical internal hybrid, such as the 
spaghetti organization, is extremely hard. The fundamental problem is that 
decentralizing an organization by means of delegation of rights to carry out certain 
actions (hiring, training, sourcing, pricing, etc.) remains a “simulation” (Day and 
Wendler 1998).  It can never really be market exchange, because, unlike independent 
agents in markets, corporate employees never possess ultimate decision rights (Hart 
1995). They are not full owners.  This means that those who possess ultimate decision 
rights can always overrule employees.  Thus, credibly committing to a policy of 
decentralization and delegation is a major problem for top-management.  This 
suggests the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1: The contribution of an internal hybrid to competitive advantage 
will be strongly influenced by top-management’s exercise of their ultimate 
decision rights (e.g., as measured by the frequency of their intervention). 
Thus, erratic intervention in decentralized projects will harm incentives and cause 
employees to hold back on knowledge building and sharing efforts.  Moreover, since 
managerial commitment is inherently hard to build and imitate (Barney 1991), we 
may put forward the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Committing to managerial policies of non-interference with 
projects/teams in internal hybrid forms is a source of sustained competitive 
advantage.  
 Essentially, the commitment problem of internal hybrids arises because such 
hybrids are organized under an authority structure.  Ultimately, the meaning of 
being a boss is that one can restrict the decisions of a subordinate, overrule him and 
perhaps fire him.  In turn, this means that although decision rights may be delegated, 
we can still trace the chain of authority in a firm, and we will always realize that 
ultimate decision-making power resides at the top.  Ulimate decision-making rights 
can only be transferred from bosses to subordinates in one way, namely by 
transferring ownership (Hart 1995).  However, transferring ownership amounts to 
spinning off the person to whom ownership is given.  It means creating a new firm. 
The advantage of such external disaggregation relative to internal hybrids is that it 
eliminates the managerial commitment problem.  The implication is not that firms 
should never adopt internal hybrids.  Considerations of knowledge sharing or asset 
specificity may overwhelm the effects of weakened incentives inside firms.  
However, firms should always consider external disaggregation as an strong 
alternative to internal hybrids (disaggregation), suggesting the following 
proposition:  
Proposition 3: Firms that manage internal and external hybrids as substitutes 
will be more profitable than other firms, ceteris paribus.   
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Conclusions 
To many firms, the adoption of new and unconventional internal and external 
hybrids is increasingly seen as important sources of competitive advantage. The 
present note has discussed a specific internal hybrid episode in the light of 
organizational economics. The Oticon spaghetti organization accomplished in a 
number of ways what it was intended to, notably an increase in innovativeness. 
However, it has been suggested that a number of inefficiencies were present in that 
administrative structure, which led to a more hierarchical structure being adopted.   
In particular, the attempt to simulate the market in Oticon foundered on the basic 
problem of doing so.  One of the main rationales of firms is exactly that they may 
avoid the high-powered incentives that characterize markets (Williamson 1985; 
Holmström and Milgrom 1991), and structure monitoring and reward schemes in 
ways that are generally not available to markets (Holmström 1999).   Arguably, the 
spaghetti organization was carried too far in its emulation of the market.  Moreover, 
there was a basic problem of credible commitment, one that centered on the apparent 
inconsistency between a policy and rhetoric of widespread delegation, emphasis on 
responsibility, etc. on the one hand, and a managerial practice of shifting priorities 
and intervention and closing down of projects on the other hand.  
 An overall theoretical implication of the reasoning in this note is that it matters 
whether knowledge-based networks are organized within or across the boundaries 
of the firm (cf. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2000). First, incentives differ between 
markets and firms.  Knowledge sharing is not necessarily best stimulated by market-
based project organization.  To the extent that knowledge sharing is a hard-to-
measure performance variable, employees are likely to put less of an emphasis on 
this.  Upon realizing this, resort to lower-powered incentives is likely (Holmström 
1999). Second, it remains the case that markets don’t rely on resource-allocation by 
means of authority whereas firms do.  Whatever their stated policies of 
”empowerment” etc., in firms all subordinates’ decision rights “are loaned, not 
owned” (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999: 56).  With respect to managerial 
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implications, the usual implication of organizational economics is to “get the 
incentives right.” In contrast, the present note has stressed “get complementarities 
right,” and particularly “make commitment credible.”  Testable propositions can be 
derived from this perspective.  
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